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ONE FOR THE PRICE OF TWO: HOW THE
SUIPREME COURT GOT IT HALF RIGHT IN

RAMDASS V. ANGELONE
Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 2113 (2000)
I. INTRODUCTION

In Ramdass v. Angelone,' the United States Supreme Court
declined to extend its ruling in Simmons v. South Carolina to allow parole-eligible defendants in state capital cases to inform
the sentencing jury of their parole-eligibility status. In Simmons,
the Court ruled that if a defendant facing the death penalty in a
state trial is parole ineligible under that state's three strikes statute, and if the state argues that the death penalty is appropriate
based at least in part on the defendant's future dangerousness,
the defendant has a federal Due Process right to inform the jury
that he is parole ineligible. Bobby Lee Ramdass sought to extend the right to this "Simmons Instruction" to defendants who,
though technically parole eligible, are for all practical purposes
ineligible.4 In rejecting his argument, the Court reiterated that
the Simmons right does not attach until the defendant is technically parole ineligible as a matter of state law.5
This Note argues that there were really two questions at issue in Ramdass and that both the plurality and the dissent failed
to separate them. As a result, the plurality correctly held that
Simmons' applicability turns on state law, but failed to identify
the constitutional flaw in the Virginia regime. Conversely, Justice Stevens' dissent properly identified that the Virginia law violated Due Process, but incorrectly suggested that because the
Virginia law was unconstitutional, Simmons must never turn on
state law. In reality, Simmons properly turns on state law, but the
Virginia law at issue violates the Due Process requirement that a
defendant be allowed to rebut the case against him. The flaw in
'120 S. Ct. 2113 (2000).
2512

U.S. 154 (1994).

'Id. (plurality opinion).
4120 S. Ct. at 2117-19 (plurality opinion).
Id at 2121-22.
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the Virginia regime has nothing to do with Simmons, however,
because it can be fixed without changing the plurality's interpretation of Simmons.
II. BACKGROUND
States have significant discretion in determining appropriate sentences for criminal offenses. 6 Because capital punishment is "qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long[,] ' 7 the Court has restricted state
discretion in capital cases with specific Due Process guarantees
which it has expanded over time.
A. SUPREME COURT CASELAW BEFORE SIMMONS

The Court's modem capital punishment jurisprudence
evolved from the 1972 case Furman v. Georgia.9 Furman struck
of the
down several state capital punishment regimes as violative
In addition, Furman
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
gave rise to a series of five cases in 1976," in which the Court
examined both the extent of state discretion and the specific
Due Process restrictions on that discretion. The Court decided
all five cases on July 2, all by plurality opinion. Justices Stevens,
Powell, and Stewart authored the plurality opinion in each of
the cases, discussing various aspects of state discretion and Due
Process requirements in state capital cases.12
In Gregg v. Georgia,13 the joint opinion emphasized that states
are entitled to substantial discretion in designing their capital
sentencing regimes. 4 The plurality stated that a capital jury
should be "given guidance regarding the factors about the
crime and the defendant that the State, representing organized
society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing deci-

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174-76 (1976).
'See
7
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
'408 U.S. 238 (1972) (plurality opinion).
101&
"Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion).
"'Seediscussion infra.
"428 U.S. 153 (1976).
"Id at 192-93.
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sion."'5 It also specifically acknowledged that states are entitled
to enhanced deference "where the specification of punishments
is concerned, for 'these are peculiarly questions of legislative
policy".'6 Despite this broad language, however, the decisions
in Gregg's companion cases significantly restricted state death
penalty discretion. For example, Florida's death penalty law
survived the Court's scrutiny in Proffitt v. porida7 primarily because the law was so restrictive.' States like North Carolina and
Louisiana, whose death penalty regimes were more expansive,
found themselves severely curtailed.
In Woodson v. North Carolin20 and Roberts (Stanislaus)v. Louisiana,2' the Court ruled that no state law offense can carry a
mandatory penalty of death.2 The plurality concluded thai
such laws violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because "[a] process that accords no significance to relevant facets
of the character and record of the individual offender or the
circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the
diverse frailties of humankind. "2 3 Finally, in Jurek v. Texas,1 the
Court allowed Texas to impose the death penalty based on future dangerousness2 provided that a jury considering such an
argument also be presented "all possible relevant information
about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine. "2

"id. at 192.
"Id.at 176.
17 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality
opinion).
"Id. at 249-250. A Florida court could sentence a defendant to death only when
(1) a statutorily prescribed aggravating circumstance was present; (2) the jury recommended death; (3) "'the facts suggesting a sentence of death [wrere] so clear and
convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ[,'" [citations omitted];
(4) the trial judge independently considered "the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances[;]" and (5) the trial judge set forth in writing particularized findings of fact and law demonstrating the appropriateness of capital punishment.
19 See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
428 U.S. 280 (1976).
21428 U.S. 325 (1976).
2 See id.
s Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
21 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality
opinion).
2Id at 276.
"6id.
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A year later, in Gardner v. Florida, the Court explicitly
brought state capital sentencing procedures under the thumb of
the Due Process Clause. "[I]t is now clear that the sentencing
process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements
of the Due Process Clause. 28 Gardner involved a defendant
whom the trial judge had sentenced to death based in part on a
confidential pre-sentence report to which the defendant did
not have access.2 In vacating the sentence, the Court noted that
Due Process does not permit a defendant to be put to death
based, "at least in part, on the basis of information which he had
no opportunity to deny or explain. 30 The Court's next two
cases 32addressing
this issue, Lockett v. Ohio3 and Eddings v. Okla-A"ta
homa, required "that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of
capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers
as a basis for a sentence less than death." 3 Lockett struck down a
state statute which prevented the trial judge, in imposing a capital sentence, from considerin as mitigating factors the defendant's lack of specific intent and the defendant's role as an
accomplice.3 5 Similarly, Eddings invalidated a state law prohibiting the court from considering as a mitigating circumstance the
defendant's unhappy upbringing35 and emotional disturbance."
The trend toward increased restrictions on state discretion
seemed to slow in 1983, when the Court decided California v.
Ramos.38 The state law at issue in Ramos required the Court to
instruct a capital jury that the governor had the power to commute a sentence of life without parole. 39 The petitioner argued,
inter alia, that he had a Due Process right to rebut that instruc"430 U.S. 349 (1977).
281& at 358.

Id at 352-54.
"Id- at 362.
" 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
"455 U.S. 104 (1982).
-"Locket4 438 U.S. at 604.
" Id. at 592-94; 608.
5Id

6455 U.S. at 107, 116.
"Id- at 107-08, 116.
3463 U.S. 992 (1983).
"Id at 995-96.

20011

RAMDASS V. ANGELONE

505

don by telling the jury that the governor could also commute a
death sentence." Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor rejected the defendant's argument on the grounds that the mandatory instruction did not run afoul of any of the specific Due
Process requirements articulated in the 1972 cases.4 ' She reiterated that, subject to the specifically articulated requirements of
Due Process, "the Court has deferred to the State's choice of
substantive factors relevant to the penalty determination."2
Despite the broad language in Ramos, however, the Court
quickly returned to curtailing state discretion.4 In Skipper v.
South Carolina," it concluded that a defendant's good behavior
in prison constituted a relevant mitiating circumstance which
the jury must be allowed to consider. In a footnote, the Court
also noted that, even if good behavior did not qualify as a mitigating circumstance, the defendant was equally entitled to present the jury with evidence of good behavior because such
evidence was an essential part of the defendant's ability to rebut
the case against him. 6 Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, argued in concurrence that states
should retain discretion to decide whether good behavior constituted relevant mitigating evidence. 7 Justice Powell suggested
that the decision should be based solely on the fact that the defendant was not allowed to rebut the case against him, leaving
state discretion regarding mitigating evidence intact.4" In Blystone v. Pennsylvani, the Court upheld Pennsylvania's capital
sentencing system both because it did not "limit the types of
mitigating evidence which may be considered," ' and because it
included a "'catchall' category providing for the consideration
of 'any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character

41id at 996-98.

'Id at 999-1012.
at 1001.

1Id.

4See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476
U.S. 1 (1986).
" 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
5Id. at 2-4, 8-9.
"Id. at 5, n.1.
17Id. at 11 (Powell,J., concurring).

OId at 10-11.
4'494 U.S. 299 (1990).
-°Id.at 305.
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and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense.'"5
Thus, when Bobby Lee Ramdass was put on trial for the
murder of Mohammed Kayani, the Court's broad declarations
of state discretion amounted to ajurisprudence which used Due
Process to impose severe restrictions on state capital punishment regimes. 2 Specifically, the Court had carved out two major enclaves of Due Process protection: "[rjelevant mitigating
evidence;" and "[d]efendant's ability to rebut the case against
him., 53

The Court had not yet considered whether either of

these enclaves prevented states from keeping parole-eligibility
evidence from capital~uries. It addressed that question in Simmons v. South Carolina.
1. The Simmons Decision
In Simmons, the Court considered the case of a defendant
who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death,
based largely on the prosecutor's argument that he posed a future danger.55 Simmons had sought to answer this argument by
presenting evidence that he was parole ineligible under South
Carolina's three strikes statute, which instructed the state Board
of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services not to grant parole to
any individual serving a sentence for a second violent crime
conviction.56 The trial judge refused to permit this argument on
the grounds that South Carolina did not57allow capital juries to
hear evidence regarding parole eligibility.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the state
suggested that Simmons was parole eligible because future hysId-

See supra notes 13-51 and accompanying text.
"Blystone, 494 U.S. at 305.
" Simmons, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).

"Id- at 160 (plurality opinion).
'IdL at 157-58. The statute read in relevant part:
The board must not grant parole nor is parole authorized, to any prisoner serving a
sentence for a second or subsequent conviction, following a separate sentencing for a prior
conviction, for violent crimes as defined in Section 16-1-60. Provided that where more
than one included offense shall be committed within a one-day period or pursuant to one
continuous course of conduct, such multiple offenses must be treated for purposes of this
section as one offense.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 1993).
17512

U.S. at 159-160 (plurality opinion).
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pothetical developments, such as a change in the law or a gubernatorial pardon, could trigger Simmons' eventual release.8
It also argued that Simmons was not technically parole ineligible because the South Carolina Board of Probation, Parole and
Pardon services, vested with authority to make final parole-eligibility decisions, had not declared him ineligible. 5"9 Simnons
argued that he must be allowed to present evidence of parole
ineligibility because such evidence was a mitigating factor and
because it rebutted the state's future dangerousness argument"o
This argument drew on both the Skipper and GardnerDue Process doctrines.'
In a fractious plurality decision, a majority of the Court
agreed only that when a defendant is parole ineligible and the
state argues for the death penalty based on future danger, the
defendant has a Due Process right to rebut the state's argument
by presenting evidence of his parole ineligibility.G The Court
rejected the state's argument regarding hypothetical future developments largely because, given the defendant's legal status
when the jury instruction was given, an instruction that he was
parole ineligible was "legally accurate. "o Speculation as to the
defendant's future eligibility status was considered irrelevant."
Consistent with the Court's previous decisions, the plurality
acknowledged Ramos' "broad proposition that we generally will
defer to a State's determination as to what a jury should and
should not be told about sentencing,"6 but justified this latest
departure from that guideline on the grounds that parole ineligibility was essential to the defendant's ability to rebut the
prosecution's case for future dangerousness."

01d. at 166.
59Ramdass, 120 S. Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting opinion) (citing Brief for Respondent at 95, Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (No. 92-9059)).
'°Simmons, 512 U.S. at 161, n.3.
6
, See supranotes 27-30 and accompanying text; notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
'Simmons, 512 U.S. at 161 (plurality opinion); id. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring);
id. at 174 (Ginsburg,J., concurring); id. at 175 (O'Connor.J., concurring).
'Simmons, 512 U.S. at 166.
MI&
'Id. at 168.
65

' d. at 168-169.
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2. The VirginiaParole-EligibilityLaw
The Virginia statute requires that one of two aggravating
circumstances, either future dangerousness or outrageous vileness, be demonstrated in any case before the death penalty may
In determining future dangerousness, "the factbe imposed
finder may consider a defendant's past criminal record, a defendant's prior history, the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the offense under consideration, and the heinousness of the crime."" Subject to federal Due Process restrictions, capital juries in Virginia are not allowed to consider
parole eligibility.6 9 The relevant statute for purposes of determining parole eligibility is Virginia's three strikes statute, which
specifies that a person convicted of three separate felonies is not
eligible for parole].
It is important to note, however, that Virginia does not consider a person legally convicted of a crime until a judgment of
conviction has been entered.7 Consequently, a jury conviction
does not count as a predicate strike for purposes of the three
strikes statute until the judge has actually entered judgment, an
event which may not occur until several weeks after the jury verdict.72 The question posed in Ramdass was whether a defendant
who has been convicted of two previous violent crimes, but
against whom judgment has been entered only in one, can invoke federal Due Process protection to override the state law
which prohibits a sentencing jury from considering evidence of
parole eligibility. In other words, does the Simmons right depend on a state-law determination of parole ineligibility, or can
a defendant with the requisite number of predicate jury verdicts

67VA. CODE ANN.

§ 19.2-264.2 (1977).
68Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 317 (Va. 2000).
69See King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d 669, 677 (Va. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
9577 (1992).

The statute provides in part:

Any person convicted of three separate felony offenses of (i) murder, (ii) rape or
(iii) robbery by the presenting of firearms or other deadly weapon, or any combination of
the offenses specified in subdivisions (i) (ii) or (iii) when such offenses were not part of a
common act, transaction or scheme shall not be eligible for parole.

VA. 71CODE ANN. § 53.1-151(B1) (1993).
See Smith v. Commonwealth, 113 S.E. 707 (Va. 1922).
7'In Ramdass, the court entered judgment two months after the sentencing phase
of the trial was completed. See infra notes 102-106 and accompanying text.
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against him invoke Simmons even if he is still technically parole
eligible?
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FACTS AND TMELINE

On the night of September 2, 1992, Bobby Lee Ramdass
and a small group of accomplices entered a 7-11 convenience
store in Fairfax County, Virginia.8 Ramdass and one of his accomplices both drew guns, and ordered the customers to lie on
the ground.7 ' Ramdass went behind the counter and told the
clerk, Mohammed Kayani, to open the safe.7' Kayani tried unsuccessfully to open the safe, at which point Ramdass, with his
gun pointed at Kayani's head, threatened to kill him if he did
Almost immediately thereafter, Ramdass
not open the safe.
pulled the trigger, but the gun did not fire." He pulled the
trigger a second time, and the gun fired, killing KayaniTh Testimony indicated that Ramdass then stood over Kayani's body
laughing.9 Before he left the store, Ramdass pointed his gun at
the customers on the floor and pulled the trigger several more
times, though the gun never fired. 0 The murder concluded a
crime spree on which Ramdass had embarked almost immediately upon completing a prison term for a 1988 robbery."' The
crime spree included another murder, an assault on a hotel
clerk, armed robberies of a Pizza Hut and a Domino's Pizza, and
the attempted murder of a taxi driver.2 Ramdass was arrested
for the Kayani murder on September 11, 1992.8
Because he had committed several crimes in a short period
of time, Ramdass was a defendant in a number of trials, all of

'Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2116 (2000) (plurality opinion).
'4 iL
76

id.

7

8im

9'Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. CL 2113, 2116 (2000) (plurality opinion); Ramdass
v. Angelone, 28 F. Supp. 2d 343, 348 (E.D. Va. 1998).
8'Ramdass, 120 S.Ct. at 2116-17; Ramdass, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 348.
Ramdass, 120 S. Ct. at 2116.
2id.
'id-

at 2117.
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which began at about the same time. 84 The chronology of verdicts and judgments in the various trials is significant. A jury
found Ramdass guilty of the Pizza Hut robbery on December 15,
1992.' Another jury found him guilty of the Domino's robbery
on January 7, 1993. 6 Judgment was entered on the Pizza Hut
verdict on January 22, 1993.87

Ramdass was convicted of the

Kayani murder in January of 1993, and the sentencing phase of
the trial was completed on January 30, with the jury recommending death. 8 Judgment was entered on the Domino's verdict on February 18, 1993,9 and judgment was entered on the
Kayani murder verdict six weeks later, on April 2, 1993.,1
B. THE TRIAL

Before the Kayani trial, which involved multiple charges including murder, robbery, and weapons possession, Ramdass
pled guilty to the robbery charge and asked the Court to find
him guilty and sentence him immediately. 9' On objection by
the Commonwealth, the trial court denied this motion and deferred both adjudication of guilt and sentencing on the robbery
charge until after the trial on the remaining charges." When
the jury found Ramdass guilty of the murder and weapons
charges, he again moved for immediate sentencing, and again
was denied.93
At the sentencing phase of the Kayani trial, the prosecutor
urged the jury to recommend a sentence of death, based on the
future dangerousness aggravating circumstance. 94 Ramdass responded that, because of the additional sentences he would receive for the other crimes he had committed, including those
for which he had not yet been tried, he would never be released
from jail. 95 Among the offenses he cited in making this argu"Id.; Ramdass v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 396, 407 (4th Cir. 1999).
8 120 S. Ct. at 2117.
'7 1d.
87Id"

a9Id.
°28 F. Supp. 2d at 350-51.
Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 566, 571 (Va. 1993).

8

93

Id.

9 120 S. Ct. at 2117.
Id
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ment was the Domino's verdict, which neither side had previously mentioned.6 He did not specifically invoke parole ineligibility under the three strikes statute. 97 In its closing argument,
the state used testimony regarding the crime spree detailed
above, including the Domino's verdict, to support its argument
that "Ramdass could not live by the rules of society 'either here
or in prison.'" 98
During its deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge
asking: "'If the Defendant is given life, is there a possibility of
Ramdass'
parole at some time before his natural death?"'
counsel suggested that the Court respond: "You must not concern yourself with matters that will occur after you impose your
sentence, but you may impose [sic] that your sentence will be
the legal sentence imposed in the case."'0' The Court rejected
this instruction, answering instead: "If you find the Defendant
guilty, which you have in this case, you should impose such punishment as you feel is just under the evidence and within the instructions of the Court. You are not to concern yourselves with
what may happen afterwards."' ' The next day, the jury unanimously recommended that Ramdass be put to death.
As noted above, judgment was entered on the Domino's
conviction on February 18, nineteen days after the jury recommended death in the Kayani case.0 3 When the Kayani trial
court reconvened for a sentencing hearing, six weeks after entry
of the Domino's judgment, Ramdass for the first time argued
that his two prior convictions rendered him ineligible for parole
under the three strikes statute."' He also noted that his counsel
had contacted three of the jurors, all of whom indicated that
the jury would have imposed a life sentence had they known
Ramdass was parole ineligible.05 The trial court rejected these
arguments and, on April 2, 1993, sentenced Ramdass to death.'
96Id.
3

1d. at 2117-18.

9Id. at 2118.

1031d

'028 F. Supp. 2d at 350.

'0120 S. Ct. at 2118 (plurality opinion).
'mSee supra note 89 and accompanying text.
14120 S. Ct. at 2118 (plurality opinion).
1"Id
"

'028 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
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C. DIRECT APPEAL

On his direct appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Ramdass argued that the trial court erred in denying his two motions
for immediate sentencing on the robbery charge.0 7 He argued
that if the motions had been granted, he could have informed
the jury of his parole ineligibility based on the three armed robbery convictions (Pizza Hut, Domino's, and the Kayani robbery)."" The Virginia Supreme Court found no error in the
denial, and noted that even if his motions had been granted
and the three strikes established, "[e]vidence of Ramdass's parole ineligibility was inadmissible in any event. We repeatedly
have held that such evidence of parole ineligibility is inadmissible in capital murder cases. '
The court applied similar logic in rejecting Ramdass' argument that the trial court erred in not informing the jury of his
parole ineligibility in answer to the jury's question regarding the
possibility of parole. 0 "We have repeatedly held that a jury
should not hear evidence of parole eligibility or ineligibility because it is not a relevant consideration in fixing the appropriate
sentence.""'
Ramdass petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari."' Three days after it decided Simmons, the
Court granted Ramdass' petition and remanded the case to the
Virginia Supreme Court for consideration in light of Simmons'
requirement that a parole-ineligible defendant be allowed to
use his ineligibility to rebut the prosecutor's future
dangerousness argument."'
On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the conviction." 4 It concluded that Simmons applied "only if Ramdass was
ineligible for parole when the jury was considering his sentence."" 5' Citing Smith v. Commonwealth,"6 the court reasoned
'07437 S.E.2d 566, 571 (Va. 1993).

'Oid at 571-72.
..Id at 572.
"Old at 573.
111Id'12Ramdass v. Virginia, 114 S. Ct. 2701 (1994).
113Id4

" Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 360 (Va. 1994).
"'Id at 361.
"6113 S.E. 707, 709 (Va. 1922).
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that because the Domino's verdict had not been reduced to
judgment, "it cannot be considered as a conviction .... ."

Con-

sequenfly, the court said, Ramdass had only two predicate
strikes under state law, the Pizza Hut conviction and the Kayani
murder, when the jury was considering his sentence."8 Because
Ramdass was eligible for parole when the jury was considering
his sentence, the court ruled that Simmons did not apply.'
Ramdass again appealed to the United States Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari, but his petition was denied."
D. PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

Following the demise of his direct appeal, Ramdass filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 2 ' The District Court
concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision was
"based on an 'unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding' and
involved an 'unreasonable application' of Simmons as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."'2 - The
judge granted Ramdass a writ of habeas corpus and remanded
the case for resentencing123

With regard to the Virginia Supreme Court's determination
of the facts, the District Court found unreasonable the court's
conclusion that the absence of an entry of judgment prevented
the Domino's verdict from qualifying as a conviction, since it
without an entry of judgconsidered the Kayani murder, also
2
ment, a predicate strike conviction. 1
With regard to the Virginia Supreme Court's application of
Simmons, the District Court held that Ramdass and Simmons were
factually indistinguishable, and that the court's reading of Simmons violated the constitutional requirements that the defendant be allowed "to introduce, and the sentencer to consider, all
relevant evidence that may be viewed in a mitigating light by the
1 7Ramdass, 450 S.E.2d at 361.

MId
1'Ramdass v. Virginia, 115 U.S. 1800 (1995).
1228 F. Supp. 2d 343 (E.D. Va. 1998).
''Id. at 363.
13Id.
2'Id- at

365.

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

514

[Vol. 91

sentencer," and that "a defendant must have both access to information upon which the sentencer relies in imposing the
death penalty, and the opportunity to rebut the same."'12 This
restricted interpretation, "concluding that Petitioner was parole
eligible based on the lack of the ministerial act of a trial court
entering judgment,, 26 allowed the [Virginia Supreme Court] to
evade "the full import of Simmons[,]"12 thus "'securing a death
sentence on the ground of future dangerousness while at the
same time concealing from the jury the true meaning of its
imprisonnoncapital sentencing alternative, namely, that life
28
parole."
without
means
[sic]
Petitioner]
ment [for
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Ramdass advanced a "functional" interpretation of Simmons, based on the District Court's
opinion.'9 He suggested that he qualified for a Simmons instruction even though judgment had not been entered in the Domino's case because "the entry of judgment was nondiscretionary,
purely ministerial, and legally insignificant."1' 30 In other words,
Ramdass argued that Simmons protection was warranted because
he was, for all practical purposes, parole ineligible. 3 A twojudge majority adopted a more restricted interpretation of
Simmons, based on the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Townes v.
Murray,132 a previous case which had dealt with Simmons:
Simmons does not hold... that "due process requires that the sentencingjury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible." It only
holds more narrowly that "where the State puts the defendant's future
dangerousness in issue, and the only available alternative sentence to
death is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entides the defendant
33 to inform the capital sentencingjury... that he is parole ineligible'

It then held that "[p]arole eligibility is a state law question. 34 Because Ramdass was parole eligible as a matter of state
law, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was not
'251d,
'2I6d

at 363-64.
at 367.

127 id.

128
Id.
12187 F.3d at 405.
130
Id.

"68 F.3d 840 (4th Cir. 1995).
"'187 F.3d at 404 (citation omitted).
"'Id.at 405.
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the only alternative to death, and consequently Simmons did not
apply.' Put another way, the majority held that a defendant
has a right to introduce evidence of parole eligibility only if he
is parole ineligible as a matter of state law.' s' The majority dismissed Ramdass' functional interpretation, labeling it "a new interpretation of Simmons7 that is simply incompatible with the
logic of Simmons itself.'1

The dissent adopted, though not explicitly, a version of
Ramdass' functionality argument.'s' "While [the Virginia Supreme Court's] result is sound under the legal technicalities of
Virginia law, in practical reality it was a certainty that Ramdass
would be parole ineligible upon entry of the Kayani conviction."3 9 The dissent did not challenge the validity of Virginia's

definition of "conviction," but argued that to the extent the Virginia law prevented Ramdass from using the Domino's conviction to rebut the future dangerousness argument, the state laV
violated the constitutional requirement that a defendant not be
sentenced to death "on the basis of information which he had
no opportunity to deny or explain.""0 In essence, the dissent
adopted the District Court's position that state law may not
abridge the Simmons right when a parole ineligibility argument4
would rebut the prosecution's case for future dangerousness. '
The dissent also suggested that because no motions which could
have overturned the Domino's conviction were pending, "only
some hypothetical future development as remote as legislative
reform, commutation, or clemency" could have prevented entry
of the conof judgment in the Domino's case. 42 "Formal entry
43
viction," therefore, "was merely a ministerial act."

Following the Fourth Circuit's decision, Ramdass again petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.'" The Court stayed his execution and granted review.'"
135Id.
17Id.

"s 187 F.3d at 413 (Murnaghan,J., dissenting).
139I1&
HI
I at 414.

'id. at 413.
415.
I1&

12d. at
143

' 44Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 523 (1999).
'Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 784 (2000).
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SUMMARY OF OPINIONS

Like Simmons, Ramdass was a plurality decision. "6 Justice
Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court for himself, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas. 4 7 ustice
O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment."" Justice Stevens authored the dissent for himself and Justices
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.14 The plurality agreed with the
Fourth Circuit's decision that Simmons is governed by state law,
and declined to extend its protection to defendants who are parole eligible as a matter of state law. 50
A. THE PLURALITY OPINION

The plurality first noted that Simmons had created a new
rule that parole-ineligible defendants are entitled to an ineligibility instruction when the prosecution argues future
dangerousness. 5 ' It immediately continued that, subject to the
Simmons rule, "the States have some discretion in determining
the extent to which a sentencing jury should be advised of
probable future custody and parole status in a future
dangerousness case ....

[T]he parole-ineligibility instruction is

required only when, assuming the jury fixes the sentence at life,

5 2 Simthe defendant is ineligible for parole under state law."'

mons can be distinguished from Ramdass,Justice Kennedy said,
because the ineligibility instruction at issue in Simmons was "leunder state law, which was not the case in Ramgally 5 accurate"
3
dass.1

Next, Justice Kennedy addressed Ramdass' two key arguments analogizing his case to Simmons- that Simmons was not
parole ineligible at the time of sentencing because the South
Carolina Board of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services had
not formally determined that he was ineligible; and that the
Simmons court allowed the instruction even though "hypothetical future events (such as escape, pardon, or a change in the
6

11 Ramdass
147id.

v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2116 (2000) (plurality opinion).

"'idat 2126 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
"'Id at 2128 (StevensJ, dissenting).
"'Id,at 2116-26 (plurality opinion).
..Id at 2119.
152id

"'Id-at 2120.

RAMDASS V. ANGELONE

2001]

law) might mean the prisoner would, at some point, be released
from prison.""
The plurality dismissed the first argument on the grounds
that the state statute rendered Simmons parole ineligible regardless of whether the parole board had acted or not. It rejected the second argument on similar grounds, noting that the
Court should look only at the defendant's legal status when the
jury is considering the verdict, disregarding future hypothetical
developments that might change the defendant's parole
status. For Justice Kennedy, the relevant point was that Simmons was legally ineligible for parole when the jury was considering his sentence; Ramdass was not.'57
In response to Ramdass' functional interpretation of Simmons, the Court concluded that such an interpretation would be
"[n]either necessary [n]or workable[,]"' because it would require the trial court to consider numerous unrelated future possibilities, including "whether a trial court in an unrelated
proceeding will grant postverdict relief, whether a conviction
will be reversed on appeal, or whether the defendant will be
prosecuted for fully investigated yet uncharged crimes."'" States
may reasonably assume, he concluded, that such inquiries
would distract juries from the real issues in the case and trigger
litigation peripheral to the central point 6 Because he believed
that states have a legitimate interest in preventing juries from
getting caught up in such peripheral questions, Justice Kennedy
concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court was correct when it
decided that Simmons does not require states to allow paroleeligibility 6arguments by defendants who are not ineligible under
state law.' '
The plurality then noted that there was no error in allowing
the prosecutor to use the as-yet unentered Domino's conviction
in support of his future dangerousness argument because Virginia law allows the introduction of "unadjudicated prior bad
'"Id at 2121.

155Id
157

1&

159Id

159 1dL
Id at 2121-22.
'6 Id. at 2122.
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acts" to demonstrate future dangerousness.' 62 The fact that
Ramdass rather than the prosecutor introduced the Domino's
robbery further supported its use in the future dangerousness
argument. 163
Ramdass submitted to the Court several public opinion polls
indicating that jurors are more likely to sentence a defendant to
death if they believe the defendant will be released on parole.'"
The plurality devoted a brief paragraph to dismissing the polls
on the grounds that "[in] ere citation of a law review to a court
does not suffice to introduce into evidence the truth of the
hearsay or the so-called scientific conclusions contained within
''% Justice Kennedy highlighted some of the possible errors in
it.
methodology in the surveys, and then cited nine cases in which
such 2 olls have been dismissed for various methodological errors.
Next, the plurality dismissed Ramdass' argument that entry
of judgment in his case was a "'ministerial act whose perform67 Justice
ance was foreseeable, imminent, and inexorable.""'
Kennedy discussed the significance of post-trial motions in Virginia criminal law practice, and noted that it is "well-established
procedure in Virginia for trial courts to consider and grant motions to set aside jury verdicts."'68 He also suggested that verdicts
are less certain than judgments, and cited Virginia caselaw to
support the proposition that ajury verdict is "uncertain and un62

1 1d&

'6ILd at 2122-23.
'"Id at 2123.
1651&

'6Id. (citingAmstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 264 (5th Cir. 1980)
(inadequate survey universe); American Home Products Corp. v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 871 F. Supp. 739, 761 (D. N.J. 1994) (respondents given extended time to answer); ConAgra, Inc. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 784 F. Supp. 700, 726 (D. Neb. 1992)
(survey failed to ask the reasons why the participant provided the answer he selected);
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 792 F. Supp. 1357, 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (questions
not properly drafted); Kingsford Products Co. v. Kingsfords, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1013,
1016 (D. Kan. 1989) (sample drawn from wrong area); Gucci v. Gucci Shops, Inc.,
688 F. Supp. 916, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (surveys should be conducted by recognized
independent experts); Schering Corp. v. Schering Aktiengesellschaft, 667 F. Supp.
175, 189 (D.N.J. 1987) (attorney contact and interference invalidates poll); Dreyfus
Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (unreliable sampling technique); General Motors Corp. v. Cadillac Marine & Boat Co., 226
F. Supp. 716, 737 (W.D. Mich. 1964) (only 150 people surveyed)).
' 67 120 S.CL at 2124 (citation omitted).
''Id.
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reliable until judgment is entered."'6 9 Finally, Justice Kennedy
noted that when the jury was considering the Kayani sentence,
Ramdass still had time to file a motion to set aside the Domino's
verdict.170 For all these reasons, the plurality agreed with the
Virginia Supreme Court that entry of judgment in the Domino's
case was not a purely ministerial act.'
The penultimate section of the opinion rejected Ramdass'
assertion that Virginia's use of entry of judgment rather than
conviction as the moment at which a conviction becomes a
predicate strike is arbitrary.'7 Here again, Justice Kennedy relied on state discretion in determining the point at which a conviction is a strike for purposes of the state statute.'73 While he
acknowledged that the availability of postjudgment relief in
state and federal forums renders even an entry of judgment uncertain, he did not consider this sufficient to invalidate the Virginia law. 174 "States may take different approaches and we see
no support for a rule that would require a State to declare a
conviction final for purposes of a three-strikes statute once a
verdict has been entered."75 By way of rationalizing the distinction, the plurality also returned to its suggestion that a judgment is more certain than a verdict.'76
Justice Kennedy pointed out that Ramdass himself did not
advance his Simmons argument until he realized that his 1988
robbery conviction did not count as a predicate strike.'" He
also noted that Ramdass had conceded in his brief that he was
convicted of the Domino's robbery on February 18, the date
judgment was entered, rather than January 7, the date the jury
returned its verdict.78 He noted that Ramdass' "change of heart
on the controlling date appears based on a belated realization"
'6Id. (citing Smith v. Commonwealth, 113 S.E. 707, 708 (Va. 1922); Blair v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. 850, 858, 861 (1874); Davis v. Commonwealth, 2000 WI 135148, at
*4, n.1 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000); Dowell v. Commonwealth. 408 S.E.2d 263. 265
(Va. Ct. App. 1991)).
'"Ramdass, 120 S. Ct. at 2124-25.
'7'Id at 2124.
'7id. at 2125.

1Id.
177Id.

17ai
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that he needed the Domino's conviction in order to be parole
ineligible.1
Finally, the plurality pointed out that state courts are free to
provide more protection than is constitutionally required, and
noted that Ramdass was afforded such additional protection because the jury was not informed that he was eligible for parole. 8 o
It also noted that Virginia had expanded Simmons by allowing a
parole-ineligibility instruction even when future dangerousness
is not an issue, 8' and that in the time since Ramdass' conviction,
the state eliminated parole for all defendants convicted of a
making the instruction available to all capital decapital crime,
82
fendants.

B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE

Justice O'Connor began her concurrence by restating the
narrow holding of Simmons cited by the Fourth Circuit.1 3 She
also reiterated that, while the question of whether a defendant
may inform the jury of his parole ineligibility is a federal question, "we look to state law to determine a defendant's parole
status." 84 She devoted the rest of her concurrence to Ramdass'
argument that entry of judgment is a ministerial act."" Justice
O'Connor conceded that "[w]here all that stands between a defendant and parole ineligibility under state law is a purely ministerial act, Simmons entities the defendant to inform the jury of
that ineligibility, either by argument or instruction, even if he is
not technically 'parole ineligible' at the moment of sentencing.' 81 6 She defined "ministerial" as "foreordained.' '

87

However,

she concluded that entry of judgment in this case was not a
purely ministerial act because "as a matter of Virginia law, a
guilty verdict does not inevitably lead to the entry of ajudgment
order."'g Even if the chances of the Domino's verdict being set
179 id

...
I& at 2126.
1811&

182Id.

"Ramdass, 120 S. Ct. at 2126 (O'Connor,J., concurring); see also Simmons, 512 U.S.
at 178 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
'"Ramdass,120 S. Ct. at 2127 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
"'Id.(O'ConnorJ, concurring).
'16Id. (O'Connor,J., concurring).
"'Id.(O'Connor,J., concurring).
"'Id.(O'Connor,J., concurring).
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aside were, as Ramdass argued, "quite remote," she concluded
such remoteness was insufficient to declare entry ofjudgment a
She also found Ramforeordained, purely ministerial act.'*
with Simmons, which
inconsistent
dass' functionality argument
"does not require courts to estimate the likelihood of future
contingencies concerning the defendant's parole eligibility."' 9
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT

Justice Stevens' lengthy dissent attacked both the Virginia
law and the plurality's subordination of Simmons to state law
generally.1 91 He argued that the Due Process right articulated in
Simmons should supercede Virginia's law because Virginia allowed the prosecutor to use a verdict which the defendant could
not use in his reply9
First, Justice Stevens pointed out that the plurality allowed
the prosecutor to use the Domino's verdict in his future
dangerousness argument even though Ramdass could not use
the verdict to rebut that argument. 3 This, he said, denied
Ramdass "'one of the hallmarks of due process in our adversary
system,' namely the defendant's right 'to meet the State's case
against him.'"'1 Because the plurality's reading of Simmons as
contingent on state law permitted this violation, Justice Stevens
concluded that state law must not be allowed to determine
whether Simmons applies in any given case.
Justice Stevens argued that Simmons and Ramdass were facHe pointed out that the relevant
tually indistinguishable.'
statute in Simmons left the determination of parole eligibility to
the South Carolina Board of Probation, Parole, and Pardon
Services.9 He quoted the state's brief from Simmons, in which
South Carolina argued that "'no state agency had ever determined that Simmons was going to be serving a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole... [because] ... the power to
" Id. (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
'"Id-at 2127-28 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
...
Ramdass, 120 S.Ct. at 2128 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
'Id. (StevensJ, dissenting).
"Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting).
"Id (StevensJ, dissenting) (citation omitted).
'9-Id. at 2128-29, 2134 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
mId at 2130 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
"'Id (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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make that determination did not rest with the judiciary, but was
solely vested in an executive branch agency, .... .51093 He also
cited the South Carolina statute, which read in part:
The board must not grant parole nor is parole authorized, to any prisoner serving a sentence for a second or subsequent conviction, following
a separate sentencing for a prior conviction, for violent crimes as defined in Section 16-1-60. Provided that where more than one included
offense shall be committed within a one-day period or pursuant to one
continuous course of conduct, such multiple offenses must be treated
for purposes of this section as one offense.

Because the Board of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services had not officially declared Simmons parole ineligible, Justice Stevens argued that both Simmons and Ramdass were
parole eligble when the juries were considering their respective
Both merely "had all the facts necessary to be
sentences.2
found ineligible at some future date. ' 0 '
He suggested that the plurality then tried to distinguish the
cases on the grounds that Simmons would inevitably be declared ineligible, which was not the case with Ramdass. 20 1

"In

other words, the plurality says that Simmons applies when there
is 'conclusive proof at the time of sentencing that the defendant will (in the future) 'inevitably' be found parole ineligible. 20 3 This standard also failed to distinguish the two cases, he
concluded, because both Simmons and Ramdass had access to
post trial motions which could have overturned their convictions.0 4
The plurality did not, Justice Stevens argued, actually rely
on either of these standards, but instead based its holding on
the absence of an entry of judgment against Ramdass, which 20it
verdict.
incorrectly asserted to be "more certain" than a jury

1

Since the plurality could rely only on this "relative certainty"
standard to distinguish Simmons from Ramdass (and to justify the
Virginia law), he argued that the flaw in that standard was fatal
'"Id.at 2131, n.7 (StevensJ, dissenting) (quotingBrief for Respondent at 95, Sim-

mons v. South Carolina,512 U.S. 154 (1994) (No. 92-9059)) (citation omitted).
'"S.C. CODEANN. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 1993).
m°Ramdass, 120 S.Ct. at 2130-31 (StevensJ, dissenting).
'lId.at 2131, n.8 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
mId. at 2131 (StevensJ, dissenting).
2"Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
2'Id. (StevensJ, dissenting).
'1& at 2132 (StevensJ, dissenting).
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to the plurality's entire conclusion.20 6 He reasoned that to the
extent there is no certainty gap between verdict and judgment,
the plurality's decision both allowed states to make arbitrary decisions regarding when a defendant may use a conviction to reand allowed them
but a future dangerousness argument,
7
statutorily to eviscerate Simmons.21

He pointed out that the Virginia statutory standard for setting aside a conviction was the same both before and after
judgment had been entered.0 M "In short, whether judgment has
been entered on the verdict has absolutely no bearing on the
verdict's 'certainty."'2 9 The plurality's only support for the relative certainty standard was a list of cases, none of which he believed indicated that a verdict was less certain than a judgment
in Virginia.2 0 Because no judicial or statutory authority supported the plurality's claim that a verdict was less certain than a
judgment, he concluded that the relative certainty standard was
invalid.2
Justice Stevens briefly discussed Ramdass' argument that entry ofjudgment is a ministerial task.21 2 He cited Rollins v. Bazil 1 '
as authority that entry of judgment is a ministerial, and not a
judicial task.
The rendition of a judgment is to be distinguished from its entry in the
records. The rendition of a judgment is the judicial act of the court,
whereas the entry of ajudgment by the clerk on the records of the court
is a ministerial, and not a judicial act .... The entry or recordation of
such an instrument in an order book is the ministerial act of the clerk
and does not constitute an integral part of thejudgment."'

He did not discuss the point further.1 5
Justice Stevens continued that because no valid standard
could justify the Virginia law, "the question of Simmons' applicability must be an issue of federal due process law[]"2 ' rather
2 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2Id. at 2132-36, 2139-42 (StevensJ., dissenting).

2Id.at 2132 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2Id. (StevensJ., dissenting).
21&I at 2132-33 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
21

" d. at 2134, n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

211Id at 2133 (Stevens,J., dissenting).

213139 S.E.2d 114 (Va. 1964).
24 Id. at 117 (citation omitted).

'-'Ramdass,120 S. Ct. at 2133 (StevensJ., dissenting).
2'6Id. at 2134 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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than state law. This interpretation, he said, is more consistent
with Simmons than the plurality's "state-law-first" approach.2 7
He briefly recounted the legal and philosophical underpinnings
of Simmons to support this conclusion.1 8
Justice Stevens began his discussion of Simmons by noting
that the Court has previously deferred to state decisions regarding what issues a capital jury may consider.219 Specifically, he
discussed Calforniav. Ramos2 ° as an example of the Court's tendency to lean in favor of allowing state discretion in capital sentencing regimes, subject to Due Process restrictions, including
the defendant's right to rebut the prosecution's case.22' In Ramos, he said, the defendant's proffered instruction that the governor could commute a death sentence as well as a sentence of
of telling
life imprisonment• "'would not "balance" the impact"'
•
222
By
the jury that the governor could commute a life sentence.
contrast, a defendant's argument that he would never be eligible for parole "quite plainly rebuts" an argument that the defendant will pose a future danger if he is not put to death.223
Thus, Justice Stevens argued that Simmons carved out a specific
Due Process exception to state discretion in that it prevented
states from allowing prosecutors to use a defendant's prior conviction to prove future dangerousness when the defendant
could not use the same conviction in his rebuttal.224 He also
cited the survey evidence, which the plurality had dismissed, to
support the contention that, since juries are more likely to impose death if they believe the defendant will be released on parole, parole ineligibility directly counters the future
dangerousness argument on which the prosecutor must rely to
secure a death sentence.s
While Justice Stevens conceded that the Simmons right must
refer to state law, he believed the plurality erred in allowing
state law to control its applicability. 2 6 Not only was the plural2'Id. (StevensJ., dissenting).

"'See id at 2134-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219Id at 2135 (StevensJ., dissenting).
"'463 U.S. 992 (1983).

"'Ramdass, 120 S. Ct. at 2135 (StevensJ., dissenting).
mil (StevensJ., dissenting) (citation omitted).
mId. (StevensJ., dissenting).
dl.
(StevensJ., dissenting).
mId at 2136 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
"'Idat 2137 (StevensJ., dissenting).
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ity's reading inconsistent with the plain meaning of Simmons,2
he said, but it would allow states to craft their statutes so as to
evade the right altogether, "convert[ing] the Simmons requirement into an opt-in constitutional rule."2 This, he said, was an
invalid reading of Simmons. 22 "The question in this case, then,

boils down to whether the plurality's line between entry of
judgment and a verdict is a demarcation of Simmons' applicability that is (1) consistent with Simmons; (2) a realistic and accurate assessment of the probabilities; and (3) a workable clear
rule. " m
First, he argued the plurality's reasoning was inconsistent
with Simmons because it found "constitutionally significant uncertainty...

[in] . . . a 'hypothetical future development[,1'"2l

specifically, the possibility that a postverdict motion, which
Ramdass had not filed, could theoretically overturn the DomSince the Simino's conviction before judgment was entered.
mons Court explicitly refused to find uncertainty in hypothetical
prognostication regarding changes in the law or a gubernatorial
pardon, he argued that it weas inconsistent to reject Ramdass'
argument on the basis of eaually hypothetical predictions about
the certainty of the verdict.
Second, he condemned the plurality's reasoning as "internally inconsistent" because it ascribed greater certainty to a
judgment than to a verdict, despite the fact that "the standard
for setting aside a verdict after the trial is the same regardless of
whether judgment has been entered."2 He pointed out that at
the time of the capital sentencing hearing, Ramdass still had
thirteen days to file a post-judgment motion in the Pizza Hut
The availability of such motions in both the Domino's
case.'
and Pizza Hut cases should, he suggested, render both convictions equally uncertain.2 Yet the plurality inexplicably found

'Id. at 2138 (StevensJ., dissenting).
mId. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2Id. at 2139 (StevensJ., dissenting).
2id (Stevens,J., dissenting).
IId (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
2
1d (Stevens,J., dissenting).
'Id. (StevensJ., dissenting).
'Id at 2140 (StevensJ., dissenting).
'Id (StevensJ., dissenting).
'Id. (StevensJ., dissenting).
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the Pizza Hut judgment certain and the Domino's verdict uncertain, based on the arbitrary entry ofjudgment standard.237
Either the Virginia law was arbitrary, Justice Stevens suggested, or the standard by which the plurality upheld it made
Simmons inapplicable in any case involving a defendant whose
predicate convictions could possibly be set aside.238 This approach, he said, was "entirely boundless. 39 If uncertainty existed any time a hypothetical future development could change
the defendant's parole eligibility status, the mere availability of
postjudgment appeals or habeas proceedings must render an
entered judgment on which all such remedies
1 have not been
240
verdict.
naked
a
as
uncertain
as
just
exhausted
If Simmons is inapplicable because at least one of the defendant's prior
convictions could be set aside before sentencing (or before the third
strike becomes final, or before whatever time the plurality might think is
the crucial moment), then it should not matter, under that reasoning,
whether it is set aside by post-trial motion, on appeal, or through state
(or federal) postconviction relief. What's more, the plurality's reasoning
So
would hold true so long as these procedures are simply available ....
long as such procedures for setting aside old convictions exist and remain technically available prior to a defendant's capital murder sentencparole ineligibility is just as
ing phase, the defendant's eventual
24
uncertain at the crucial moment. '

He concluded that the plurality's reasoning, and hence the
Virginia law, either drew an arbitrary distinction between preand post-judgment avenues of relief, or eviscerated Simmons by
preventing it from attaching to any defendant whose predicate
convictions could be appealed in any forum.242 Since either
conclusion was untenable, he said, the plurality's reasoning was
fatally flawed and the Virginia law was invalid. 4
Finally, Justice Stevens asserted that the Simmons right
should attach at the moment of conviction because "it is a natural breaking point in the uncertainties inherent in the trial process[,] . . . [and]

27Id.

. . .

because the State itself can use the

(Stevens,J., dissenting).

mId. at 2140-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"'Id.at 2140 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 2140-41 (StevensJ, dissenting).
40

41
2 id.
2

12Id.

(Stevens,J., dissenting).
(StevensJ, dissenting).

2431Id. at

2141 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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defendant's prior crimes to argue future dangerousness after a
jury has rendered a verdict... ."244
In conclusion, Justice Stevens reiterated his positions that
both the Virginia Supreme Court and the plurality erred in
making the Simmons right dependant on state law, and that the
use ofjudgment rather than verdict as the point at which a conviction becomes a strike was a convoluted, unreasonable application of Simmons.24 This decision, he suggested, "turns on
whether the hypothetical possibility that the trial judge might
fail to sign a piece of paper entering judgment on a guilty verdict should mean that the defendant is precluded from arguing
his parole ineligibility to the jury."24 6 ForJustice Stevens, the an-

swer to that question was a definite "no."7

V. ANALYSIS
This case actually involved two separate constitutional questions: whether the Simmons right is contingent upon state law;
and whether the Virginia regime is consistent with Due Process.
Justice Kennedy was really arguing the first question, on which
he correctly concluded that Simmons does turn on state law;2 '
while Justice Stevens was primarily concerned with the second,
on which he was correct that the Virginia law violates the "right
to rebut" element of Due Process in capital cases.2 "9 This is not

immediately obvious because all of the Justices confused the two
questions, treating them instead as parts of a single issue.Y Justice Kennedy found that Simmons' applicability turned on state
law, and concluded that since state law in this case left the defendant technically parole eliible, Simmons did not apply and
Due Process was not violated. ' The question of whether the
Virginia law was consistent with Due Process requirements other
than Simmons occurred to him only in passing, and he dismissed
it quickly on the grounds that "[s]tates may take different ap-

2"Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2"Id at 2142-43 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2"d. at 2142 (StevensJ., dissenting).
247Id. at 2142-43 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2"Id. at 2116-26 (plurality opinion).
29Id at 2128-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
MId.
"Id. at 2116-26 (plurality opinion).
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proaches. ' ' Justice O'Connor's conclusion was similar to Justice Kennedy's, though she found that a state law would run
afoul of Simmons if it imposed a purely ministerial task between
a defendant and the parole-ineligibility argument.s Justice
Stevens argued, seemingly in reverse, that since the Virginia law
allowed the prosecutor to refer to a conviction which the defendant could not in rebuttal, the state law violated Due Process, 2and
consequently Simmons could not be contingent on state
54
law.

When one separates the two questions, it becomes clear that
Simmons is contingent on state law, but also that the Virginia law
violates the right-of-rebuttal element of Due Process.75 The
fact that Virginia's law violates Due Process, however, does not
mean that Simmons supercedes state law.sG
In fact, Virginia's vio27
lation has nothing to do with Simmons.

A. SIMMONS IS CONTINGENT ON STATE LAW

The defendant in Simmons was parole ineligible as a matter
of state law.s The only rule on which a majority of the Court
agreed was that a parole-ineligible defendant has a right to rebut a future dangerousness argument by telling the jury that he
is ineligible for parole, and consequently will not pose a future
threat.
Justice O'Connor limited her concurrence to cases
where "the State seeks to show the defendant's future
dangerousness . . .in cases in which the only available alterna-

tive sentence to death is life imprisonment without possibility of
parole ....,,20 The Court said nothing regarding the state's
method of determining whether parole is available, nor did the
Court give any indication of a scenario in which a parole-eligible
defendant would be entitled to the Simmons Instruction. ° On
the contrary, the very language of the decision strongly sugv. Angelone, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 2125 (2000) (plurality opinion).
2"i'd at 2126-28 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
2"Id.at 2128-43 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2"See infra notes 258-319 and accompanying text.
See infranotes 302-05 and accompanying text.
2"'
See infranotes 306-19 and accompanying text.
2" See S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 1993).
2'2Ramdass

2" Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).

'6Id. at 177 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
"'Id. at 154-71.
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gested that such a scenario could not exist.

2
1

If the instruction

is limited to cases in which the only alternatives are death or life
without parole, a parole-eligible defendant is by definition prevented from receiving Simmons protection. "6
B. THE STATE-LAW-FIRST INTERPRETATION OF SIMMONS IS
CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS

Justice Stevens was concerned that allowing state law to control Simmons' applicability posed Due Process problems because
it would allow states to end-around the Simmons right with cleverly worded statutes. 26 This concern is unjustified for two rea-

sons. 265
First, other Due Process rights, such as the right of a defendant to be provided with copies of trial transcripts and other

materials for state appeals, are equally contingent on state law.z
The Supreme Court has recognized that indigent defendants
have a Due Process right to be provided with trial transcripts to
aid them in preparing their state appeals, even if they cannot afford to pay for the transcripts.26 7 However, states are under no
constitutional obligation to provide appellate courts or even the
right to appellate review of a conviction, even in a capital case.
A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a
criminal case, however grave the offense of which the accused is
convicted, was not at common law, and is not now, a necessary
element of due process of law. It is wholly within the discretion
of the state to allow or not to allow such a review. "G
Thus, indigent prisoners have a Due Process right to the use
of trial transcripts in their state appeals, but the state may eviscerate that right by refusing to provide any avenue of state relief.270 Taking the comparison a step farther, if a state were to
restrict appellate review of criminal convictions to specific
classes of defendants (leaving aside the Equal Protection and
%id.
See Id.

Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2138 (2000) (StevensJ., dissenting).
See infra notes 266-83 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 267-73 and accompanying text.
67Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Id. at 17-18; See also McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
2'Giffin, 351 U.S. at 18.

See infra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
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Due Process implications of such a law), defendants not eligible
for appellate review would have no right to free transcripts.
States have just as much ability to end-around this Due Process
guarantee as they do the Simmons right.272 Thus, the mere fact

that a state could statutorily avoid Simmons does not violate Due
Process. 3
Second, even if the possibility of a state end-around of Simmons did pose Due Process problems, there is virtually no plausible scenario in which a state would exploit that possibility. 7 A
state could only avoid Simmons in one of two ways: either it could
repeal its three-strikes statute, leaving all capital defendants eligible for parole; or it would have to word its three-strikes statute
such that a defendant was parole eligible until all possible avenues of post-conviction relief, including state relief and federal
habeas relief, were exhausted.275 Since no state is required to
have a three-strikes statute, the former strategy would not be
constitutionally suspect.27 6 The latter is implausible because a

state which adopted that strategy would eviscerate its own threestrikes statute in the process.
Such a statute would allow individuals with three or more criminal convictions to remain eligible for parole during the years in which their various appeals
wound their way through state and federal courts. 8 Since the
entire point of a three-strikes statute is to get repeat offenders
off the street for good, it would make no sense for a state legislature to allow prisoners to remain parole eligible long after their
third conviction, simply to prevent a fraction of offenders from

271

1 See infranotes 266-70 and accompanying text.

27 But see Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2137-38
(2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2
13See infra notes 266-72 and accompanying text.
274 See infra notes 275-84 and accompanying
text.
25 See Ramdass, 120 S. Ct. at 2119-23; Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 16174 (1994) (plurality opinion).
276As of 1997, only twenty-one states, the District of Columbia,
and the Federal
Government had passed three strikes statutes. See Martha Kimes, The Effect of Foreign
Criminal Convictions Under American Repeat Offender Statutes: A Case Against The Use Of
Foreign Crimes In DeterminingHabitual Criminal Status, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503,
504 (1997).
'" See infranotes 278-84 and accompanying text.
28See Ramdass, 120 S. Ct. at 2140-41 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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offering parole-ineligibility rebuttals to future dangerousness
arguments.m
Such a scenario becomes even more implausible when one
considers that the parole-ineligibility instruction is far from a
talismanic shield against the death penalty 70 Due Process simply requires that the jury take rebuttal arguments into account;
nowhere does it imply that such arguments must alter the sentence the jury chooses to impose. a - The parole-ineligibility argument also does not prevent the prosecution from arguing
that the defendant poses a future danger.2
Of course, the fact that a defendant is parole ineligible does
not prevent the State from arguing that the defendant poses a
future danger. "The State is free to argue that the defendant
will pose a danger to others in prison and that executing him is
the only means of eliminating the threat to the safety of other
inmates or prison staff."28
Since a state could end-around Simmons only by destroying
its own three-strikes statute, and because no state is required to
have such a statute,Justice Stevens' concerns are unwarranted.2
C. JUSTICE STEVENS FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM WITH
RAMDASS

Justice Stevens correctly concluded that the outcome of
Ramdass was constitutionally invalid, 2 but failed to identify the
specific flaw in the decision. He began by tying to analogize
The argument
Ramdass and Simmons, but did not succeed.
that Simmons was parole eligible because the state parole board
had not yet declared him ineligible is incorrect.2n Simmons was
ineligible for parole as a matter of state law, even absent a formal declaration by the parole board, because the relevant South
Carolina statute cited by Justice Stevens forbade the board from
mSee Michael G. Turner, et. al., "Three Strilkes And You're Ou" Lxguslatun: A National
Assessment FED. PROBATION, Sep 1995, at 16.
2"Simmons, 512 U.S. at 165, (plurality opinion).
" id.; see also supra notes 27-51 and accompanying texL
2Simmons, 512 U.S. at 165, n. 5 (plurality opinion).
=Id.
See supranotes 27583 and accompanying text.
Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2128-43 (2000) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2"Id. at 2130-32.
2
'7 See S.C. CODF ANN. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 1993).
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granting parole to "any prisoner serving a sentence for a second
or subsequent conviction ....
Once Simmons had received
his second conviction, the parole board was statutorily prohibited from granting him parole. 289 At the very best, declaration of
Simmons' ineligibility was a purely ministerial act in that it was
"foreseeable, imminent and inexorable." 29 0 Contrary to Stevens'
assertion, nothing in either Simmons or Ramdass suggested that
either decision was based on a future inevitability. ' At the
moment of sentencing, Simmons was technically ineligible for
parole, even without a declaration from the parole board.29 2
The inverse of that argument, that Ramdass was parole ineligible as a matter of state law, is also incorrect. 29 3 According to
Virginia law, a defendant was parole eligible until he had three
predicate convictions, where conviction required entry of judgment.9
At the time the jury was considering his sentence,
Ramdass had a single predicate conviction which had been reduced to judgment. 29 5 Since it was not uncommon for verdicts
in Virginia courts to be set aside before they are reduced to
judgment,29' 629 entry
of judgment did not qualify as a "purely min7
isterial act."
Justice Stevens' citation of Rollins v. Brazile29 8 to support the
contention that entry of judgment is ministerial is puzzling.
The language he quoted differentiates rendition ofjudgment by
the trial judge, which it specifies is a judicial act, from entry of
judgment by the clerk, a ministerial act.'
It is inconceivable
that the plurality and the Virginia Supreme Court used the "entry of judgment" language in reference to the clerk's act of remId.
289id2'Ramdass,

120 S. Ct. at 2124 (plurality opinion) (citing Brief for Petitioner at 21,

36).
2'See Id.; Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161-74 (1994) (plurality opinion).
"' See Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 (2000) (plurality opinion); Simmons, 512 U.S. at 166-70; S.C. CODEANN. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 1993).
"' SeeVA. CODEANN.

§ 53.1-151(BI) (1993).

"'See, generally, Smith v. Commonwealth, 113 S.E. 707 (Va. 1922).
2"See Ramdass, 120 S. Ct. at 2117 (plurality opinion).
2" See Id. at 2124.
297Id. at 2127 (O'Connor,J.,
concurring).
"'Idat 2133 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citingRollins v. Brazile, 139 S.E.2d 114, 117
(Va. 1964).
2"Id. (citing Rollins, 139 S.E.2d at 214).
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cording the judgment, rather than the judge's act of rendering
it. 00 Even if they did, the judicial act of rendering judgment was
also lacking in the Domino's verdict, "' undermining Justice
Stevens' argument.
D. T=E RELATIVE CERTAINTY STANDARD IS NOT THE KEY FLAW IN
THE VIRGINIA REGIME

The plurality committed a strategic mistake when it adopted
the relative certainty standard, suggesting that "the possibility of
post-verdict relief renders a jury verdict uncertain and unreliable until judgment is entered."3s None of the caselaw the plurality cites supports this statement. 03 Additionally, as Justice
Stevens correctly pointed out, the statutory standard for setting
aside ajury verdict was identical to the standard for setting aside
an entered judgment. 4 However, the entire debate about relative certainty was not relevant to the issue at hand, because the
constitutional problem with the Virginia law is not only unrelated to the difference in certainty between a verdict and a
judgment, but unrelated to Simmons altogether. s"5

'Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 360, 361 (Va. 1994).
"'SeeRamdass v. Angelone, 120 S. CL 2113, 2117 (2000) (plurality opinion).
"2M_

at 2124.

"s Id. at 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens notes that the plurality cites
eleven cases in support of this proposition. In fact, it cites only four, none of which
suggest that an entered judgment is more certain than a verdict. The remaining
seven cases are cited merely to demonstrate that Virginia courts routinely consider
and grant prejudgment motions to set aside verdicts. These cases are relevant only to
the question of whether entry ofjudgment is a ministerial task. Dowell v. Commonwealth, 408 S.E.2d 263 (Va. App. 1991) and Smith v. Commonwealth, 113 S.E. 707
(Va. 1922), both state that a verdict is not legally a conviction under Virginia law until
judgment has been entered. Blair v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. 850 (1874) held that the
governor may pardon a person who has been convicted of a crime before the sentence has been imposed. It was already established that the governor could pardon
the person after sentence had been imposed, so this decision simply established that
an entry ofjudgment is no less certainthan a naked verdict. Davis v. Commonwealth,
2000 WL 135148 (Va. App. 2000), merely held that because of the possibility of postverdict motions, events subsequent to the jury's recommendation of sentence were
not properly characterized as "none of the court's concern." Id.at 4, n.1. The opinion does not even address the issue of post-judgment motions, let alone find any disparity in certainty.
3id.at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See infra notes 306-19 and accompanying text
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E. THE VIRGINIA LAW VIOLATES DUE PROCESS INDEPENDENT OF
SIMMONS

Perhaps because he was so focused on the Simmons context
of the case, Justice Stevens failed to realize that the Due Process
flaw with the Virginia regime is not that it is inconsistent with
30 ' The
Simmons, but that it is inconsistent with Gardnerv. Florida.
Gardnerright of rebuttal exists independent of Simmons, and requires that a defendant not be sentenced to death "on the basis
of information he had no opportunity to deny or explain."' 7
Virginia law allowed the prosecutor in Ramdass to argue that the
defendant posed a future danger, relying in part on the Domino's verdict.0 8 Further, it allowed the prosecutor to inform the
jurors that a jury had convicted Ramdass of the prior robbery.3 9
Since the jury was not aware that Virginia does not consider a
jury verdict to be a conviction until judgment has been entered,
the Domino's conviction was a fait accompli from the jury's perspective when they were considering the sentence.310 Were the
conviction truly a fait accompli, however, the Kayani conviction
would have rendered Ramdass parole ineligible, and consequently eligible for Simmons protection.3 The Supreme Court's
previous capital punishment decisions strongly suggest a guiding principle that ajury may not sentence a defendant to death
on the basis of incomplete or inaccurate information." That
the bulk of such analysis has focused not on the "right to rebut"
evidence" guarantee,
•
•
guarantee, but rather on the "mitigating
•
313
does not change the underlying principle. To the extent that
Virginia law allows a jury to sentence a defendant to death in
part because it believes that a particular conviction is established, but does not allow the defendant to address the jury as if
430 U.S. 349 (1977); See infranotes 307-19 and accompanying text.
..
"0Gardner,430 U.S. at 362.
' Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2118 (2000) (plurality opinion).
"Old at 2117-18.
"' See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161-74 (1994) (plurality opinion).
The Court seems to take for granted the contention that had the Domino's conviction been reduced to judgment, the Kayani verdict would have been Ramdass' third
predicate strike, rendering him parole ineligible. Technically, this is not true, since
the Kayani verdict would not become a predicate strike until the court entered judgment, long after the jury had finished deliberating.
12
' See supranotes 13-53 and accompanying text.
"'See supra notes 13-53 and accompanying text.
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that conviction were established, Virginia allows the defendant
to be put to death without being allowed to meet the prosecution's case. 4 As Justice Stevens pointed out at the beginning of
his dissent,
[t]here is an acute unfairness in permitting a State to rely on a recent
conviction to establish a defendant's future dangerousness while simultaneously permitting the State to deny that there was such a conviction
when the defendant attempts to argue that he is parole ineligible and
therefore not a future danger. 5

This constitutional flaw is unrelated to Simmons because it
could be remedied without affecting Ramdass' exclusion from
Simmons protection. 6 Virginia could fix the problem if it prohibited the prosecutor from arguing future dangerousness
based on "unadjudicated prior bad acts 31 7 which, once adjudicated, would render the defendant parole ineligible. Alternately, Virginia could disallow use of such acts in future
dangerousness arguments altogether. Under such a rule, neither the defendant nor the prosecutor would be allowed to discuss any conviction which had not been reduced to judgment,
with the result that evidence of a prior bad act would become
available to both parties at the moment judgment was entered,
giving them equal access to the conviction and its parole-eligibility implications." 8 In either case, Virginia would have fixed
s m without
the constitutional flaw in its capital punishment
regime
of Simmons.
changing the plurality's interpretation
VI. CONCLUSION

Ramdass v. Angelone involved two different constitutional
questions: whether the defendant's right to present evidence of
parole ineligibility in a capital case, established in Simmons v.
South Carolina,"" turns entirely on whether the defendant is ineligible for parole as a matter of state law; and whether the Vir3"Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2117-18 (2000) (plurality opinion); 212830 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
15
at 2128.
2 See infa notes 317-19 and accompanying text.
-'"Ramdass,120 S. C. at 2122 (plurality opinion).

5"1 Id

9
See supra notes 306-18 and accompanying text.
5120 S. Ct. 2113 (2000).
s21512 U.S. 154 (1994).
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ginia capital sentencing regime, which allows the prosecutor to
use unadjudicated prior bad acts to argue future dangerousness,
complies with Due Process. None of the Justices separated the
two questions, with the result that both the plurality and the dissent answered one question correctly. The plurality correctly
concluded that the Simmons right properly turns on the defendant's parole-eligibility status as determined by state law. The
dissent recognized that the Virginia regime violates the Due
Process requirement that a defendant not be sentenced to
death based'' 22on evidence which he "had no opportunity to deny
or explain.

On its face, this decision seems to increase the deference
which federal courts owe to state supreme court determinations
of a defendant's eligibility for Simmons protection. Nonetheless,
the emphasis which the Ramdass plurality placed on state discretion is unlikely to have a significant impact on the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence because the Court has rarely
allowed precedent which favors state discretion to stand in the
way of a new Due Process restriction on that discretion. Ironically, since the Court essentially validated the flawed Virginia
law, this decision will probably make it far more difficult for a
defendant to challenge the unconstitutional aspect of the Virginia capital sentencing regime.
Christopher Varas

..Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977).

